Command Crisis: Influence Of Command Culture On The Allied Defeat At Suvla Bay by Major Stuart J. Archer

Author:Major Stuart J. Archer [Archer, Major Stuart J.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, World War I, Europe, Great Britain, General, Germany, Naval
ISBN: 9781786250209
Google: ZqlvCwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2015-11-06T17:40:43+00:00

CHAPTER FOUR — CONCLUSION

“The English lacked the ability to extract the utmost from their success. Their methods were responsible for it, because they were not based on any war experience. Experience of colonial wars was of no use here.” — General Hans Kannengiesser, The Campaign in Gallipoli

The most resounding issue revealed in this analysis of Suvla Bay is the extent to which a previously successful military organization was rendered completely ineffective by the influence of its own culture. The British failures that were long attributed to poor leadership and communication are now more accurately attributed to cultural and systemic failures. In essence, the British Army lost at Suvla Bay because its senior commander was unable to effectively direct an operational subordinate and because it rigidly adhered to an outdated system of tactical command. These two factors are more the result of traditional methods of command and less representative of British leadership. Organizations, especially those that have undergone rapid expansion or tumultuous changes, must be able to recognize the need to adapt or change elements of their culture. The significance of Suvla Bay to modern military organizations is that it vividly demonstrates what may happen to successful organizations when they become too embedded within their culture and consequently fail to recognize the need for change.

The personalized command culture that worked effectively in British colonial operations was completely inadequate for warfare at Gallipoli and Suvla Bay. The British Army placed its trust in leaders who were all products of a successful colonial army. British spirit, leadership, and ingenuity, had created an unmatched colonial empire and there seemed no reason why those same traditions and organizations could not successfully overcome the obstacles of modern warfare. The inability of the British leaders to recognize the flaw of applying traditional methods of command on new and substantially different army organizations resulted in the catastrophic defeat of an entire British corps by a force of less than 1,500 Turks.

This analysis has revealed three relevant aspects of the British command culture that inhibited the IX Corps from achieving any measure of success at Suvla Bay. The first aspect regards the extraordinary emphasis the British command system placed on seniority. The British culture had evolved into a system that favored years in service and dates of rank over ability and competence. The appointment of Sir Frederick Stopford to command the IX Corps was based entirely on his seniority within the standing British rank structure. No one within the British high command made a worthwhile attempt to analyze his ability or experience nor was any analysis of his ability considered necessary. In the British system, designating command or promoting an individual to senior rank simply because he was the most senior, was a common and acceptable practice. The eventual result of this practice was a corps of senior leaders devoid of initiative and ability and aged to the point where there physical health adversely affected their performance.

The second aspect of culture relates to the British doctrine of restrictive control wherein tactical commanders were not trusted or encouraged to act on their own.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.